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Abstract: The Convention on the Use of Electronic Communi-
cations in International Contracts (CUECIC) was approved by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL) in July 2005. It is now available for ratification by U.N.
member states. CUECIC is based on the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce adopted by UNCITRAL in 1996. The Model Law has
served as the basis for electronic signature and electronic com-
merce legislation at the federal and state levels in the United
States and other countries. The similarity of CUECIC to domestic
electronic commerce laws should facilitate its use for international
contracts. CUECIC requires, however, that its terms be inter-
preted by domestic courts according to its international character
and the need to promote uniformity in its application. These same
rules of interpretation also apply to the UNCITRAL Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), but no im-
plementing legislation accompanied CISG ratification by the
United States to locate the CISG, and to annotate decisions inter-
preting it, within the body of the code of federal statutes. Like the
CISG, there will be no authoritative judicial body or expert com-
mentary to resolve conflicts or ambiguities in judicial interpreta-
tions of CUECIC. Varying interpretations may also result from
the different versions of CUECIC that could be created by national
declarations varying its scope of applicability. Therefore, despite
the common source of CUECIC and U.S. electronic commerce laws
in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, the use of
CUECIC for international commercial contracts might be re-
strained by the same procedural difficulties that have limited the
use of the CISG.
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2001, the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) endorsed a set of recommenda-
tions by its Working Group on Electronic Commerce (Working
Group) for the Working Group to prepare an international in-
strument dealing with selected issues of electronic contracting,
and to examine possible legal barriers to electronic commerce in
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existing international conventions.1 Recommendations for legal
reform to accommodate the growing use of automated informa-
tion exchange in international commerce were first made to
UNCITRAL in 1984.2 UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce (MLEC) in 1996 as a paradigm for domes-
tic legislation of U.N. member nations.3 Subsequently, such na-
tional legislation often diverged from MLEC principles and the
electronic commerce laws of other nations, particularly regard-
ing authentication of electronic signatures. 4 These divergences,
and the limited applicability of domestic legislation to parties in
foreign locations, led the United States in 1998 to recommend
an international convention on electronic commerce based on
preexisting MLEC principles. 5 These principles include techno-
logical neutrality, national source neutrality, and party auton-
omy in the choice of applicable contract law and rules.
6
The proposed convention was also encouraged for addi-
tional reasons. In some countries, the supremacy of interna-
tional treaty law, including pre-existing commercial
conventions, over subsequent ordinary domestic law, such as
MLEC-based commercial law, creates a potential conflict be-
tween domestic law permitting electronic contracts and pre-ex-
isting treaties requiring physical documents. 7 A convention on
1 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Elec-
tronic Commerce on the Work of its Forty-Fourth Session, 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
571 (Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Final Working Group Report].
2 Philip M. Nichols, Electronic Uncertainty Within the International Trade
Regime, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1379, 1405 (2000).
3 Id.
4 John D. Gregory, The Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on Electronic Con-
tracts, 59 Bus. L. 313, 317 (2003).
5 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group on Electronic Commerce,
Note by the Secretariat, Proposal by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/WG.IV/WP.77 (May 25, 1998), available at http://www.uncitral.org (last vis-
ited Apr. 8, 2005) (The market appears unlikely to settle on one universal authen-
tication mechanism or model of implementation in the near future. Parties appear
headed toward a choice between different types of authentication regimes, depend-
ing on the nature of the transaction and upon the prior relationship, if any, among
the parties to the transaction. For example, a large company may choose one au-
thentication method for the electronic system used to procure goods from suppli-
ers, but a different method for on-line purchases by its customers).
6 Christopher T. Poggi, Note, Electronic Commerce Legislation: An Analysis
of European and American Approaches to Contract Formation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L.
224, 272 (2000).
7 Gregory, supra note 4, at 317.
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electronic contracts could equalize the legal consequences of
electronic and physical communications used under these pre-
existing conventions.8 In addition, as John Gregory states, "The
rules of the MLEC were done as a model law at the time it was
adopted because people were tentative about its solutions. Now
they have proved valid and workable and deserve more legal
force behind them."9 Although the UNCITRAL Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) does not
require physical writings for contracts to be governed by it (sub-
ject to party declarations otherwise), its provisions did not con-
template, and therefore do not provide for electronic
communications. 10
At its forty-fourth session in Vienna, spanning from Octo-
ber 11 -22 2004, the Working Group recommended certain sub-
stantive articles for a draft Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts (CUECIC), and re-
quested the UNCITRAL Secretariat to draft conforming
changes to the remaining articles of the convention.'1 In addi-
tion, the Working Group requested the UNCITRAL Secretariat
to circulate the draft convention to UNCITRAL member govern-
ments for their comments in anticipation of the full UNCITRAL
commission's approval of the convention in July 2005.12 On
July 15, 2005, the full UNCITRAL commission approved the fi-
nal version of CUECIC. 13
The UNCITRAL Secretariat noted that "[tihe draft conven-
tion contains a few substantive rules that extend beyond merely
reaffirming the principle of functional equivalence [between
physical and electronic communications] where substantive
rules are needed in order to ensure the effectiveness of elec-
8 "In favor of preparing an e-contracts convention, it was said that a conven-
tion could contribute to the legislative arsenal of means of increasing legal cer-
tainty or commercial predictability in electronic business transactions-alongside
the MLEC and other instruments." Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 318.
11 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, T 10.
12 Id.
13 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Report of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law on the work of its thirty-eighth session, Annex 1, U.N.
Doc. A/60/17 (July 26, 2005) [hereinafter Final UNCITRAL Report].
[Vol. 17:261
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/6
2005] UNCITRAL ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS CONVENTION 265
tronic communications." 14 Although many CUECIC substan-
tive legal rules are based on the MLEC, 15 the procedural
framework of CUECIC closely resembles the structure of the
CISG, particularly regarding scope of application, statutory in-
terpretation principles, and declarations by ratifying countries
of variations from default legal rules. 16 This procedural frame-
work will affect the degree of acceptance and utilization of
CUECIC by major trading nations like the United States.
17
Therefore, the procedural framework is addressed first below,
and is followed by a comparison of the substantive rules of
CUECIC with those of MLEC and other U.S. federal and state
laws.
II. CISG As CUECIC'S PROCEDURAL MODEL
UNCITRAL adopted the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in 1980.18
14 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Draft Convention
on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, Addendum:
Background information, 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/577/Add.1 (Nov. 17, 2004) [here-
inafter Note by the Secretariat].
15 See Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, $ 109 (describing the effect
of location of information system on rules for place of business determination).
16 Compare Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex I, art. 1("Scope of
application (1) This convention applies to the use of electronic communications in
connection with the formation or performance of a contract between parties whose
places of business are in different States. (2) The fact that the parties have their
places of business in different States is to be disregarded whenever this fact does
not appear either from the contract or from any dealings between the parties... (3)
Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character of the
parties or of the contract is to be taken into consideration in determining the appli-
cation of this Convention."), with United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, art. 1,
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html (last visited June
1, 2005) [hereinafter CISG], ("(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of
goods between parties whose places of business are in different States: (a) when
the States are Contracting States; or (b) when the rules of private international
law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State. (2) The fact that the
parties have their places of business in different States is to be disregarded when-
ever this fact does not appear either from the contract or from any dealings be-
tween, or from information disclosed by, the parties at any time before or at the
conclusion of the contract. (3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or
commercial character of the parties or of the contract is to be taken into considera-
tion in determining the application of this Convention").
17 See Bruno Zeller, International Trade Law: Problems of Language and Con-
cepts?, 23 J.L. & COM. 39, 40-41 (2003).
18 CISG, supra note 16.
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The CISG became effective in the United States on January 1,
1988, after eleven nations ratified the convention ("Contracting
States"). 19 As of March 2005, 65 countries have become Con-
tracting States to the CISG by ratifying the convention, includ-
ing Canada, Mexico and China, some of the United States'
largest trading partners. 20 The Working Group in 2001 identi-
fied the CISG as "a readily acceptable framework for on-line
contracts dealing with the sale of goods."21 CUECIC's sphere of
application rules, rules of statutory interpretation, and proce-
dures for derogation from default rules through national decla-
rations replicate similar rules in the CISG.22
A. Sphere of Application Rules
1. Place of Business Scope of Application Rule
Article 1 of CUECIC, "Scope of application," in paragraph 1,
establishes the basic test for applicability of CUECIC to busi-
ness transactions, stating that the "Convention applies to the
use of electronic communications in connection with the forma-
tion or performance of a contract 23 between parties whose
places of business are in different States."24
The CISG contains the same basic rule of diversity of the
parties' places of business and adds a second requirement that
either the location of the parties' places of business must be in
Contracting States, or that the conflict-of-laws rules of private
international law must be applied by a forum to choose a Con-
tracting State's version of the CISG as applicable law. 25
19 See, Status: 1980 - United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral__
texts/sale-goods/1980CISG status.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
20 See Pace Law School CISG Database, CISG: Table of Contracting States,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2005).
21 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group on Electronic Commerce,
Note by the Secretariat, Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce, Possible Future
Work in the Field of Electronic Contracting: An Analysis of the United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, TI 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
WG.IV/WP.91 (Feb. 9, 2001).
22 See infra Part II.A-C.
23 The Working Group proposed this sentence without the additional phrase
"[or agreement]" in its recommendation of paragraph 1 of Article 1. See Final
Working Group Report, supra note 1, 18.24 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 1, 1.
25 Id. See also CISG, supra note 16, art. 1.
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In a previous CUECIC draft, a second part of the applica-
bility rule had required that (a) the "states" where the places of
business are located be parties to the CUECIC convention; or
(b) the conflict-of-laws rules of private international law be ap-
plied by a forum to choose CUECIC as applicable law; or (c) the
parties to the transaction agree that CUECIC is the applicable
law. 26 This formulation adopted CISG Article 1's two alterna-
tive grounds for application of the convention, and added a third
basis for applicability: the transaction parties' agreement that
CUECIC is the applicable law.27 The CISG, however, also per-
mits the parties to make a specific reservation against the effec-
tiveness of its default conflict-of-laws applicability rule.2
8 The
United States has used this reservation to "opt-out" of this
rule's application under the U.S. version of CUECIC.
29
Despite the broad language of Article 1, paragraph 1, the
"prevailing view" in the full UNCITRAL commission was that
"the convention should only apply when the laws of a Con-
tracting State applied to the underlying transaction. '30 This
application would result not merely from the location of a forum
for a dispute between foreign parties in a state that has ratified
CUECIC, but also from the application of a Contracting State's
law through the required conflict-of-laws analysis by the dis-
pute forum.31
In Working Group discussions, concerns were expressed re-
garding the CUECIC's scope of application requirements, and
the likelihood of dissimilar interpretations of the restrictions on
applicability through Contracting State reservations and decla-
rations.32 As with the CISG, 33 however, the goal of maximum
26 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group IV (Electronic Com-
merce), Note by the Secretariat, Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce - Electronic
Contracting: Provisions for a Draft Convention, Annex, art. 1, 1 1 (a)-(c), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.110 (May 18, 2004) [hereinafter Penultimate Draft CUECIC].
27 See CISG, supra note 16, art. 1(1); See also 15 U.S.C. Appendix (Supp.
1987).
28 "Any state may declare at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratifi-
cation, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by subparagraph
(1)(b) of article 1 of this Convention." See CISG, supra note 16, art. 95.
29 Id.
30 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, 22.
31 Id.
32 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 38-39.
33 "Many CISG provisions are the product of compromise and thus we must
ask whether these compromises have proven to be effective or have resulted in a
7
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international acceptance of CUECIC through flexibility of
terms was balanced against the goal of promotion of legal uni-
formity and predictability.34 The Working Group finally agreed
to "establish the broadest possible scope of application as a de-
parture point, while allowing states for which a broad scope of
application might not be desirable to make declarations aimed
at reducing the reach of the draft convention."35
CUECIC Article 1, therefore, establishes a broad rule of ap-
plicability.36 Unlike the CISG, CUECIC does not require that
both parties to the transaction have their places of business in
Contracting States.3 7 Nor does it require that a national ver-
sion of CUECIC be chosen as applicable law through the con-
flict-of-laws analysis of a court or other forum.38 The prevailing
view of the full UNCITRAL commission, however, appears to
require such a choice of law in order for CUECIC to apply to a
transaction, unless other applicability requirements established
in a national declaration are satisfied. 39
chaotic jurisprudence." Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in Interna-
tional Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 299, 305 (2004).
34 "Commerce depends on confidence. For the electronic marketplace to flour-ish in both its customer and enterprise dimensions, buyers and sellers alike musthave at least the level of confidence in the outcome of electronic commerce as theyhave in more traditional kinds of transactions." Group of High-Level Private SectorExperts on Electronic Commerce, Issues and Opportunities in the Implementation
of Electronic Commerce, 42, (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment - OECD) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/25/1893999.pdf (last visited Nov.
2, 2005).
35 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 39.
36 See Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 1.
37 Compare CISG, supra note 16, art. 1, 1 1 ("This Convention applies to con-
tracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in differentStates: (a) when the States are Contracting States."), with Final UNCITRAL Re-port, supra note 13, art. 19, $ 1 ("Any State may declare, in accordance with article21, that it will apply this Convention only: (a) When the States referred to in arti-
cle 1, paragraph 1 are Contracting States to this Convention.") (CUECIC givesContracting States the option to limit the scope of applicability to only those con-tracts where both parties have their places of business in States that are Con-
tracting States).
38 "[Flor those States in which such a broader scope of application might cre-
ate difficulties, draft article 18 might contemplate a reverse exclusion, namely that
a State might declare that it would apply the Convention only if both parties werelocated in Contracting States." Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 35.
39 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, 22.
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In the final CUECIC draft, two of the previous draft's three
alternative requirements for CUECIC applicability were moved
from Article 1, covering scope of applicability, to Article 19, cov-
ering national declarations. 40 Article 19 provides that a Con-
tracting State may declare that CUECIC will govern only if (a)
the places of business of the parties to the transaction are lo-
cated in Contracting States; or (b) the parties agreed that
CUECIC will govern their transaction. 41 As authorized decla-
rations, they remain options to limit the national scope of appli-
cation of CUECIC, rather than default requirements for
CUECIC to apply to all transactions. 42 The alternative declara-
tion that a forum conflict-of-laws analysis might require appli-
cation of CUECIC to a transaction was eliminated, but the final
UNCITRAL report on CUECIC indicates that this deletion was
for redundancy 43 since the application of CUECIC through con-
flict-of-laws analysis remains an underlying assumption of the
operation of the broad CUECIC scope of applicability rule in Ar-
ticle 1.44
CUECIC Article 1, paragraph 2, provides a parol evidence
rule that excludes evidence of the location of places of business
in different States if it is not contained in the contract itself.
45
This rule, however, is subject to two broad exceptions. First, it
permits parol evidence when it appears from "dealings between
the parties."46 Second, it permits parol evidence when it ap-
pears from "information disclosed by the parties at any time
before or at the conclusion of the contract."47 The resulting bal-
ance in favor of permitting parol evidence is more like the CISG
rule on parol evidence 48 than it is like the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) rule.49
CUECIC Article 1, paragraph 3, prohibits a reviewing fo-
rum from considering the nationalities of the parties to the
40 Compare Penultimate Draft CUECIC, supra note 26, art. 1, with Final UN-
CITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 19.
41 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 19, 1.
42 Id. Annex 1, art. 19, T 2.
43 Id. T 127.
44 Id. 22.
45 Id. Annex 1, art. 1, 9 2.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 CISG, supra note 16, art. 1, 2.
49 U.C.C. § 2-202 (2005).
9
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transaction, or the character (civil or commercial) of the parties
or the contract in determining whether the CUECIC governs a
given transaction.50
CUECIC Article 4, "Definitions," sets forth a new definition
of "place of business" as "any place where a party maintains a
non-transitory [sic] establishment to pursue an economic activ-
ity other than the temporary provision of goods or services out
of a specific location."51 CUECIC Article 6, "Location of the par-
ties," reiterates two rules from Article 10 of the CISG concern-
ing multiple places of business and habitual residence as a
place of business.52 In addition, Article 6 creates rules on pre-
sumptions created by party indications of place of business, and
the effect of the location of equipment, technology, information
systems, domain names and electronic mail addresses. 53 For
example, if a party has not made any indication of the location
of its place of business "it would be deemed to be located at the
place that meets the definition of 'place of business"' pursuant
to Article 4(h).54
2. Declarations on the Scope of Application
CUECIC Article 19, "Declarations on the scope of application",
provides that:
1. Any Contracting State may declare, in accordance with article
21, that it will apply this Convention only:
(a) When the States referred to in article 1, paragraph 1 are
Contracting States to this Convention; or
(b) When the parties have agreed that it applies.
2. Any Contracting State may exclude from the scope of applica-
tion of this Convention the matters it specifies in a declaration
made in accordance with article 21. 55
CISG Article 92's general rules on declarations require that
they be made "at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession," and limit declarations to the rules in
50 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 1, 3.
51 Id. Annex 1, art. 4(h).
52 Id. Annex 1, art. 6, H 2-3. See also CISG, supra note 16, art. 10.
53 Id. Annex 1, art. 6, 1, 4.
54 Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, 39.
55 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 19.
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Parts II and III of the CISG.56 A separate declaration may be
made under CISG Article 95 for a Contracting State to exclude
the default conflict-of-laws rule for scope of CISG applicability,
but it must also be made at the time of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession to the convention.5 7 The effect of these
provisions is to limit the flexibility of states to adjust the scope
of applicability of the CISG after ratification.
CUECIC Article 21, paragraphs 1 and 4, provide that decla-
rations under CUECIC Article 19, paragraphs 1 and 2, may be
made, modified or withdrawn at any time. 58 Arguments were
made that such flexibility would reduce the harmonization of
law CUECIC intended to create.59 The contrary Working
Group view, however, prevailed that the rapidly changing tech-
nologies of communication justified such flexibility.60
CUECIC Article 20, paragraph 1, "Communications ex-
changed under other international conventions," lists six inter-
national conventions to which "[tihe provisions of this
Convention apply to the use of electronic communications in
connection with the formation or performance of a contract
.. ,"61 This provision fulfills the CUECIC goal of removing legal
obstacles to electronic commerce under existing international
conventions, without the burdensome necessity of their individ-
ual amendment. 62
56 CISG, supra note 16, art. 92(1).
57 Id. art. 95.
58 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 21, 1. 4.
59 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 32.
60 Id.; See also Gregory, supra note 4, at 328-29 (discussing the uncertain ef-
fect of variant contract terms established pursuant to an exercise of party auton-
omy under CUECIC Article 3 or CUECIC Article 19(1)(c)).
61 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 20, 1. (These con-
ventions are the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958); Convention on the Limitation Period in the
International Sale of Goods (New York, 14 June 1974) and Protocol thereto (Vi-
enna, 11 Apr. 1980); United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (Vienna, 11 Apr. 1980); United Nations Convention on the Liability
of Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade (Vienna, 19 Apr.
1991); United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Let-
ters of Credit (New York, 11 Dec. 1995); United Nations Convention on the Assign-
ment of Receivables in International Trade (New York, 12 Dec. 2001)).
62 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 48; See also Note by the Secre-
tariat, supra note 14, 58-59. This provision would ensure that a Contracting
State "directs its judicial bodies to use the provisions of the draft convention to
11
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CUECIC Article 20, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, sets forth, at a
minimum, three different paths for national declarations to fol-
low, stating:
2. The provisions of this Convention apply further to electronic
communications in connection with the formation or perform-
ance of a contract to which another international convention,
treaty or agreement not specifically referred to in paragraph 1
of this article, and to which a Contracting State to this Conven-
tion is or may become a Contracting State, applies, unless the
State has declared, in accordance with article 21, that it will
not be bound by this paragraph.
3. A State that makes a declaration pursuant to paragraph 2 of
this article may also declare that it will nevertheless apply the
provisions of this Convention to the use of electronic communi-
cations in connection with the formation or performance of any
contract to which a specified international convention, treaty
or agreement applies to which the State is or may become a
Contracting State.
4. Any State may declare that it will not apply the provisions of
this Convention to the use of electronic communications in con-
nection with the formation or performance of a contract to
which any international convention, treaty or agreement speci-
fied in that State's declaration, to which the State is or may
become a Contracting State, applies, including any of the con-
ventions referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, even if such
State has not excluded the application of paragraph 2 of this
article by a declaration made in accordance with article 21.63
A negative declaration under paragraph 2 would operate as
a blanket declaration of non-applicability of the provisions of
CUECIC to conventions not listed in paragraph 1, such as fu-
ture conventions, treaties or agreements, (a course that might
be described as the "general in, unless general opt out" path).
Paragraph 4 (the "specific opt out" path) permits a State the
flexibility to choose specific existing or future conventions,
whether or not listed in paragraph 1, to be excluded from
CUECIC governance. 64 All such declarations under paragraph
4 (and presumably paragraph 3, the "specific opt in" path)
address legal issues relating to the use of data messages in the context of those
other international conventions." Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, 58-59.63 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 20, 2-4.
64 Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, % 61.
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would prevent the application of CUECIC "in respect of all con-
tracts to which another international convention applies," and
should not be allowed for the exclusion of "only certain types or
categories of contracts covered by another international conven-
tion."65 Because each of these types of declarations can be made
at any time,66 the potential "path" of declarations over time
could become complex.
CUECIC Article 21, "Procedure and effects of declarations,"
provides for declarations to be made, modified or withdrawn at
any time, subject to a waiting period, before such actions take
effect if they occur after the entry into force of CUECIC.67
CUECIC Article 22 prohibits reservations to the Convention.68
Like the CISG, CUECIC creates what Anthony Aust calls
declarations that are "disguised reservations,"69 rather than
true interpretations of convention provisions. Like a formal res-
ervation, such a declaration "purports to exclude or to modify
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their appli-
cation to that State."70 Unlike a formal reservation, however, a
"disguised reservation ' 71 may be made at any time, and, like an
interpretative declaration, it has no formal rules concerning ob-
jection or acceptance by other ratifying States.72 CUECIC's use
of the CISG terminology of declarations promotes states' accept-
ance of the convention at the cost of textual uniformity.
3. Transactions Excluded or Varied from CUECIC
CUECIC Article 2, paragraph 1, excludes from its scope of
application "electronic communications" relating to "[ciontracts
concluded for personal, family or household purposes."73 This
65 Id.
66 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 21, 1.
67 Id. Annex 1, art. 21.
68 Id. Annex 1, art. 22. "Reservations were prohibited in order to avoid the
triggering of a formal system of acceptances and objections, which the Working
Group agreed was inappropriate for a convention affecting private business trans-
actions rather than State actions. See Final Working Group Report, supra note 1,
30.
69 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAw AND PRACTICE 104 (2000).
70 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 3.
71 AusT, supra note 69, at 104.
72 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 20.
73 Id. Annex 1, art. 2, 1.
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language is the same as Article 2(a) of the CISG, which excludes
from CISG applicability the sale of goods for personal, family or
household use.74 However, CUECIC lacks CISG's Article 2(a)
exception which states that the CISG applies to goods bought
for personal, family, or household use, if the seller neither knew
nor ought to have known that the goods were bought for any
such use.75 The Working Group concluded that the increase in
international consumer transactions, especially via the in-
ternet, between the time of adoption of the CISG and the time of
CUECIC had turned merely theoretical problems of applicabil-
ity of international conventions to consumer transactions into a
fundamental conflict with domestic consumer law policy. 76 The
inapplicability of commercial law norms, upon which CUECIC
is based, to consumer transactions was used to justify an abso-
lute exclusion of such transactions from CUECIC, without the
CISG exception for lack of knowledge of the transaction pur-
pose. 77 Further, this exclusion also applies to matrimonial
property contracts. 78
CUECIC Article 2, paragraphs 1(b) and 2, enumerate cer-
tain types of financial agreements that are excluded from the
scope of CUECIC. 79 This exclusion is premised on the rationale
that such agreements are already well-drafted to effectuate
electronic commerce, and that relegation of this exclusion to na-
tional declarations "would be inadequate to reflect that real-
ity." 0 In comparison, the CISG adds to the personal, family or
74 CISG, supra note 16, art. 2(a).
75 See Penultimate Draft CUECIC, supra note 26, art. 2, 1 n.12 (describing
debate by Working Group that resulted in exclusion of consumer transactions
without condition of actual or presumed knowledge of a transaction party).
76 Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, I 33-35.
77 Id.
78 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, 28.
79 Id. Annex 1, art. 2, I 1(b), 2.
The listed agreements are: (i) Transactions on a regulated exchange; (ii)
foreign exchange transactions; (iii) inter-bank payment systems, inter-
bank payment agreements or clearance and settlement systems relating
to securities or other financial assets or instruments; (iv) the transfer of
security rights in, sale, loan or holding of or agreement to repurchase se-
curities or other financial assets or instruments held with an intermedi-
ary; and (v) bills of exchange, promissory notes, consignment notes, bills
of lading, warehouse receipts or any transferable document or instrument
that entitles the bearer or beneficiary to claim the delivery of goods or the
payment of a sum of money. Id.
80 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 91 61.
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household goods exclusion, exclusions of "stocks, shares, invest-
ment securities, negotiable instruments or money," specific ex-
clusions of sales by auction, pursuant to legal order or right,
sales of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft, and sales of elec-
tricity.8 1 CUECIC's exclusion of only personal, family or house-
hold contracts, and certain types of financial agreements, might
result in a broader default scope of applicability than the
CISG.8 2 The possibility of future reduction in CUECIC uni-
formity through various Contracting State declarations of non-
applicability of CUECIC to certain transactions is justified as
reflecting "territory-specific issues that should be better dealt
[sic] at the State level."8 3
4. Party Autonomy Rules
CUECIC Article 3, "Party Autonomy," uses the same basic
language as CISG Article 6 that "[t]he parties may exclude the
application of this Convention or derogate from or vary the ef-
fect of any of its provisions."8 4 The UNCITRAL Secretariat,
however, previously construed this freedom of contract as
prohibiting transactional parties from altering the CUECIC re-
quirements for electronic "writings," "signatures" and "origi-
nals."8 5 The CISG adds a limitation on transaction party
autonomy that prohibits any variance by party agreement from
81 CISG, supra note 16, art. 2(b)-(f).
82 Compare CISG, supra note 16, art. 2(b)-(f) ("This Convention does not apply
to sales: (b) by auction; (c) on execution or otherwise by authority of law; (d) of
stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money; (e) of
ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft; () of electricity."), with Final UNCITRAL Re-
port, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 2, 1(b)-2 ("(1) This convention does not apply to
electronic communications relating to any of the following: (b) (i) Transactions on a
regulated exchange; (ii) foreign exchange transactions; (iii) inter-bank payment
systems, inter-bank payment agreements or clearance and settlement systems re-
lating to securities or other financial assets or instruments; (iv) the transfer of
security rights in, sale, loan or holding of or agreement to repurchase securities or
other financial assets or instruments held with an intermediary. 2. This Conven-
tion does not apply to bills of exchange, promissory notes, consignment notes, bills
of lading, warehouse receipts or any transferable document or instrument that en-
titles the bearer to beneficiary to claim the delivery of goods or the payment of a
sum of money.").
83 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 165.
84 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 3. See also CISG,
supra note 16, arts. 6, 12.
85 See infra Part III.B.5.
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Contracting State declarations requiring written contracts.8 6
This exception is unnecessary in CUECIC, given that its pur-
pose is to facilitate electronic communications.8 7
Upon ratification by the U.S. Senate, CUECIC will become
supreme federal law that pre-empts state law.8 8 The CISG
scope of application framework has been described as "opt out"
coverage, because, "[u]nless the parties expressly 'opt out' of the
CISG (e.g., by stating that another law will govern), or derogate
from its provisions (e.g., by a contrary clause in the contract),
the Convention will apply to any international contract that
meets its jurisdictional requirements. '"8 9 Similarly, CUECIC
will also apply automatically to contracts meeting its jurisdic-
tional requirement that are not excluded by a specific national
declaration, regardless of the transaction parties' awareness of
CUECIC applicability, or lack thereof. Therefore, a transaction
to which CUECIC applies by its own jurisdictional rules may
only be avoided through exclusion by a national declaration, 90
by the parties' exclusion of CUECIC from applicability,91 or by a
derogation from or variation of CUECIC rules by agreement of
the parties.92
B. Rules of Interpretation
Article 5 of CUECIC, "Interpretation," replicates the lan-
guage of Article 7 of the CISG, as follows:
1. In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniform-
ity in its application and the observance of good faith in inter-
national trade.
2. Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in con-
formity with the general principles on which it is based or, in
86 CISG, supra note 16, arts. 6, 12.
87 See Final Working Group Report, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
88 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
89 JEROLD A. FRIEDLAND, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss AND FI-
NANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 155 (2002); See also CISG, supra note 16, arts. 1, 6.
90 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 19, T 2.
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the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law ap-
plicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
93
In 1997, Michael Joachim Bonell and Fabio Liguori com-
mented on CISG judicial decisions, stating that "[v]ery rarely do
decisions take into account the solutions adopted on the same
point by courts in other countries." 9 4 By 1999, ten years after
its effective date in the United States, only fifteen federal court
opinions and two state court opinions had cited the CISG.95 As
of June 1, 2005, seventy-one United States cases citing the
CISG were reported.96 Uncertainty about the rules for CISG
interpretation 97 contributes to the reluctance of U.S. courts to
apply and interpret the CISG, even where it is applicable. It
might also encourage U.S. lawyers to advise their clients to take
the "safe course" whereby the parties, through mutual agree-
ment, exclude the application of the CISG from their interna-
tional contracts. 98
Interpretive problems inevitably occur in the use of any
transnational code, due to language differences 99 and difficul-
ties in identifying common transnational commercial contract
practices.100 Consensus must also be reached on which gov-
erning values make up the "general principles" of a convention,
in addition to any stated principle of good faith.10 1 These values
might include the favoring of interpretations that preserve,
93 Id. art. 5.
94 Michael Joachim Bonell & Fabio Liguori, The U.N. Convention on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods: A Critical Analysis of Current International Case Law,
Part 1, UNIFORM L. REV (1997), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
biblio/libol.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
95 James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International
Sales, 32 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 273, 280 (1999).
96 See Pace Law School CISG Database, Case Law on Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edul
cisg/new-features.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
97 See Zeller, supra note 17, at 43-45.
98 See Allison E. Butler, The International Contract: Knowing When, Why and
How to "Opt Out" of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 76 FLA. B. J. 24 (2002).
99 Zeller, supra note 17, at 43-44.
100 Id. at 46-47.
101 Id. at 48.
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rather than sever, contract obligations, and the recognition of
human error. 10 2
A consensus has been slow to develop on basic principles of
statutory interpretation for the CISG, particularly concerning
whether a broad or a narrow interpretative approach is appro-
priate. 10 3 Therefore, the requirement in CUECIC Article 5 for
CISG-type rules of interpretation is based more upon aspira-
tions for future harmonization of international commercial law
than on successful CISG experience with such rules.
The CISG was intended to replace, within its scope of appli-
cation, prior national commercial laws, such as the UCC and its
judicial interpretations, with a new "stateless" type of jurispru-
dence. 104 Statutory rules for electronic commerce in many na-
tions, however, do not predate the 1996 Model Law on
Electronic Commerce, and they follow the MLEC rules on many
issues. To the extent that national electronic commerce laws
are more similar to each other than, and of more recent common
origin compared to, other national commercial laws, the danger
of non-uniformity in interpretations of CUECIC provisions be-
cause of over-reliance on domestic statutory parallels, should be
less than for the CISG. Therefore, the problems of application
of CUECIC Article 5 rules of interpretation should be fewer
than under the CISG. For example, when an alternate language
formulation for the CUECIC article on locating a place of busi-
ness by reference to location of information systems was sug-
gested in Working Group deliberations,10 5 one reason proposed
for maintaining the existing draft language was its previous use
in MLEC, and that it "should be kept for the sake of uniformity
between the draft convention and domestic legislation already
enacted on the basis of the Model Law."10 6
102 Id.
103 Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem With Common Law Jurisdictions, 10
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 217, 228-29 (2001).
104 See CISG, supra note 16, pmbl. ("BEING OF THE OPINION that the adop-
tion of uniform rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and
take into account the different social, economic and legal systems would contribute
to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and promote the develop-
ment of international trade...").
105 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 6, 4.
106 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, [ 109.
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The trend of recent CISG judicial decisions has been toward
recognition of the mandatory character of CISG Article 7's rules
of interpretation, 10 7 despite institutional and practical pres-
sures for interpretation of CISG rules according to domestic
norms such as those of the Uniform Commercial Code.' 0 8
James Bailey has argued, however, that the CISG, despite its
stated intentions, 0 9 is an obstacle to, rather than a catalyst for,
uniformity in international sales law for four reasons related to
its rules of interpretation. 110 First, the CISG, like CUECIC, fo-
cuses on substantive legal rules rather than on relations be-
tween States, and it is, therefore, considered a "self-executing
treaty" that does not require implementing legislation to be-
come effective after ratification.' 1' The U.S. Congress did not
enact implementing legislation for the "self-executing" CISG,
which makes the convention, and U.S. cases citing it, difficult to
find in the codes of federal statutes. 112 This may lead judges
and lawyers in the United States to ignore or avoid the CISG.
113
Second, CISG rules of interpretation "are so obscure that the
treaty's own guidelines for producing consistent interpretations
fail to promote uniformity.""14 Third, the CISG party autonomy
rules lead to "bewildering and potentially contradictory re-
sults. ..,11 Fourth, it is difficult to identify foreign cases citing
and interpreting the CISG." 6
Measures should be taken prior to CUECIC ratification to
resist pressures to bend CUECIC norms toward familiar domes-
tic parallels. In order to comply with CUECIC Article 5, U.S.
lawyers and judges must learn international jurisprudence in-
terpreting CUECIC. Previously proposed mechanisms to in-
crease knowledge of the "international character" 1 7 of the
107 See DiMatteo et al., supra note 33, at 328.
108 Id. at 303.
109 CISG, supra note 16, pmbl., art. 7.
110 Bailey, supra note 95, at 276, 281.
111 Id. at 281-82.
112 The CISG is in the Appendix to Title 15 of the U.S. Code.
113 Bailey, supra note 95, at 276-77.
114 Id. at 276.
115 Id.
116 "[Cross-referencing to other CISG precedents is too difficult, and the Con-
vention is simply ignored by courts as well as legal practitioners." Kilian, supra
note 103, at 235.
117 CISG, supra note 16, art. 7(1).
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CISG might serve the same purpose for CUECIC. These mech-
anisms include the establishment of both unofficial and official
UNCITRAL-sponsored web-based collections of CUECIC-re-
lated judicial decisions from all signatory nations. 118 Further-
more, the direct codification of CUECIC into federal statutes
would enable U.S. lawyers and judges to better analyze and
compare foreign and domestic judicial decisions and scholarly
commentaries. Consideration should also be given to the estab-
lishment of an official commentary by a permanent editorial
board for CUECIC, similar to the official commentary on the
Uniform Commercial Code. This would create an authoritative
evaluation of CUECIC-related judicial and scholarly analyses
and opinions that might otherwise be difficult for non-experts to
understand. 119 The U.S. members of the Working Group pro-
posed a mechanism for information sharing among nations
about CUECIC judicial interpretations and national experience
with the practical operation and effectiveness of the conven-
tion.' 20 The proposal was eliminated from the final draft of
CUECIC,121 but a similar informal mechanism might achieve
the same goal. With such implementation mechanisms, the use
of CUECIC by U.S. parties to international trade transactions
might avoid the types of procedural obstacles that have re-
stricted the acceptance in practice of the CISG in the United
States.122
C. Proposed Amendment Rules
The draft CUECIC Article 22, "Amendments," which was
eliminated from the final version, attempted to apply the les-
118 See Case Law on Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), supra note 96. See also United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts, available at http://www.unci-
tral.org/uncitral/en/case-law.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
119 See Michael Joachim Bonell, A Proposal for the Establishment of a 'Perma-
nent Editorial Board' for the Vienna Sales Convention, in International Uniform
Law In Practice, Acts And Proceedings of the 3rd Congress On Private Law Held
by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT,
Rome 241, 242 (Sept. 1987). See also Zeller, supra note 17, at 40-41; Bailey, supra
note 95, at 290-91, 300, 315.
120 See infra Part II.C.
121 Id.
122 See Zeller, supra note 17, at 40-41.
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sons learned from experience with previous UNCITRAL
conventions. 123
Variant A of proposed Article 22 provided for a conference
of Contracting States to be convened to consider amendments
upon the vote of one third of the Contracting States.124 A two-
thirds majority of the states present and voting at the confer-
ence would have been required for adoption of amendments.
125
Variant B of proposed Article 22 would have required either
the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations or the UNCI-
TRAL Secretariat to prepare periodic reports on how the Con-
vention has "operated in practice." 126 A conference of the
Contracting States could thereafter have been convened, upon
the vote of one quarter of the Contracting States, to consider:
(a) The practical operation of this Convention and its effective-
ness in facilitating electronic commerce covered by its terms;
(b) The judicial interpretation given to, and the application made
of, the terms of this Convention; and
(c) Whether any modifications to this Convention are
desirable. 127
Proposed amendments would have been approved by a vote
of two-thirds of Contracting States "participating in the confer-
ence." 128 Variant B reflected a proposal made by the United
States through the Working Group.'
29
The emphasis of Variant B on the practical operation and
effectiveness of the Convention reflects the practical difficulties
that U.S. lawyers have experienced in understanding the terms,
interpretations and basic applicability of the CISG to private
business transactions. 30 Variant B might, therefore, have rep-




127 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, 144.
128 Id.
129 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Draft Convention
on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, Annex I, art.
22 n.ll, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/577 (Nov. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Final Draft CUECIC].
130 Id. art. 22, Variant B ("1. The [Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations]
[secretariat of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law] shall
prepare reports [yearly or] at such [other] time as the circumstances may require
for the States Parties as to the manner in which the international regimen estab-
lished in this Convention has operated in practice. 2. At the request of [not less
21
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resented a method of avoidance of similar frustrations in apply-
ing CUECIC, through the sharing of practical experience with
CUECIC implementation among Contracting States. Variant
B, paragraph 2(b), reinforces this analysis through its emphasis
on judicial interpretations of CUECIC terms.131
Article 5 of CUECIC requires judges (and arbitrators) to in-
terpret CUECIC primarily according to principles set forth in
other interpretations of CUECIC, domestic or foreign, and pri-
vate international trade law principles, rather than according
to comparable domestic law principles.132 (The Uniform Elec-
tronic Transactions Act, as enacted by U.S. States, is the logical
source of comparable domestic jurisprudence on electronic com-
merce that must be resorted to only if no sources of interpreta-
tion embodying the "international character" of CUECIC are
available. 133) The practical difficulties in determining applica-
ble international principles, however, have limited the accept-
ance and implementation of the CISG in the United States in
ways that Variant B sought to avoid.134
Neither of the proposed amendments were included in the
final version of CUECIC. Objections to each proposal centered
on the change that each would have caused to the customary
practice of UNCITRAL member agreements by consensus,
rather than by formal voting.1 35 Absent an amendment provi-
than twenty-five percent of] the States Parties, review conference of Contracting
States shall be convened from time to time by the [Office of Legal Affairs of the
United Nations] [secretariat of the United Nations Committee on International
Trade Law] to consider: (a) The practical operation of this Convention and its effec-
tiveness in facilitating electronic commerce covered by its terms; (b) The judicial
interpretation given to, and the application made of, the terms of this Convention;
and (c) Whether any modifications to this Convention are desirable."). See Zeller,
supra note 17, at 43-45 (Uncertainty about the rules for CISG interpretation con-
tributes to the reluctance of U.S. courts to apply and interpret CISG, even where it
is applicable.).
131 Final Draft CUECIC, supra note 129, art. 22, Variant B, 2(b) (Article 2
states "At the request of [not less than twenty-five per cent ofl the States Parties,
review conferences of Contracting States shall be convened from time to time by
the [Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations] [secretariat of the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law] to consider: . . .(b) The judicial in-
terpretation given to, and the application made of, the terms of this convention.").
Id.
132 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 5.
133 See infra Part III.
134 See Final Draft CUECIC, supra note 129, art. 22, Variant B.135 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, if 146-47.
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sion, changes to CUECIC may be implemented if proposed by
the full commission or, pursuant to a treaty, by the Contracting
States.136
III. MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AS CUECIC's
SUBSTANTIVE MODEL
A. Definitions and Effect on Information Requirements
The Model Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC) supplies
precursors for four of the eight definitions set forth in CUECIC
Article 4. These are the definitions of "data message," "origina-
tor," "addressee," and "information system."137 Four new defini-
tions created in CUECIC are "communication," "electronic
communication," "automated message system," and "place of
business."13 Article 7 provides that CUECIC shall have no ef-
fect on laws requiring disclosure of identities, places of business
or other information. 139 The Working Group did not accept a
proposal to add a requirement for transaction parties to disclose
the location of their places of business.
140
B. Legal Recognition of Electronic Communications
1. Legal Equivalency Rules
CUECIC Article 8, "Legal recognition of electronic commu-
nications," paragraph 1, establishes the fundamental rule that
"[a] communication or a contract shall not be denied validity or
enforceability on the sole ground that it is in the form of an elec-
tronic communication."' 41 This rule of legal equivalence is de-
rived from the MLEC,' 42 and it is also stated in various forms in
136 Id.
137 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Model Law on Electronic Commerce
Adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, art. 2(a),
(c), (d), (f), G.A. Res. 51/162, U.N. Doc. A/51/162 (Jan. 30, 1997) [hereinafter
MLEC]; Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 4(c)-(f).
138 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 4(a), (b), (g), (h).
139 Id. Annex 1, art. 7.
140 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 116.
141 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 8.
142 "Information shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely
on the grounds that it is in the form of data message." MLEC, supra note 137, art.
5. "In the context of contract formation, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an
offer and the acceptance of an offer may be expressed by means of data messages.
Where a data message is used in the formation of a contract, the contract shall not
23
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the U.S. federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce (E-SIGN) Act,143 and the Uniform Electronic Trans-
actions Act (UETA), the model state law.144
CUECIC, upon its ratification by the U.S. Senate, will pre-
empt any conflicting E-SIGN rules for international transac-
tions. 145 E-SIGN will thereafter remain the governing law for
interstate electronic transactions only in the U.S. states that
have not enacted a version of UETA that is sufficient to avoid
federal preemption. 146 A state version of UETA will apply to
intrastate transactions elsewhere and to interstate transactions
governed by the law of a UETA state.
CUECIC Article 8, paragraph 2, provides that "[n]othing in
this Convention requires a party to use or accept electronic com-
munications, but a party's agreement to do so may be inferred
from the party's conduct."147 No mention is made of a signature
requirement in this article, because "most legal systems did not
impose a general signature requirement as a condition for the
validity of all types of contract."148
be denied validity or enforceability on the sole ground that a data message was
used for that purpose." Id. art. 11.
143 See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7001(a) (2000) [hereinafter E-SIGN]. ".... [W]ith respect to any transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce - (1) a signature, contract, or other record
relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceabil-
ity solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such trans-
action may not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely because an
electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation." Id.
144 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 7 (1999), available at http://www.
law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm (1999) (last visited Nov. 2, 2005)[hereinafter UETA]. Section 7 provides: "(a) A record or signature may not be de-
nied legal effect or enforcement solely because it is in electronic form. (b) A con-
tract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic
record was used in its formation. (c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an
electronic record satisfies the law. (d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic
signature satisfies the law." Id.
145 E-SIGN, supra note 143, §7001 (a).
146 At this time, only four states, Georgia, Illinois, New York and Washington
have not yet enacted versions of UETA. See National Council of State Legislatures,
UETA Enactments, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/CIP/ueta-statutes.htm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2005).
147 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 8, $ 2. Although the
use of electronic communications in contracting is voluntary, the applicability of
CUECIC to such a contract will be mandatory, unless the parties successfully "opt
out" of such coverage. Id. art. 3. See also Butler, supra note 98.
148 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 118.
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2. Technological Neutrality
CUECIC Article 9, "Form requirements," sets forth specific
rules confirming the functional and legal equivalency of elec-
tronic and physical communications. 149 Paragraph 1 estab-
lishes that "[n]othing in this Convention requires a contract or
any other communication to be made or evidenced in any partic-
ular form." 150 Besides establishing form equivalency, para-
graph 1 confirms the rule of technological neutrality among
possibly competing electronic authentication systems.
151
3. Electronic "Writing"
CUECIC Article 9, paragraph 2, provides that "[w]here the
law requires that a communication or a contract should be in
writing, or provides consequences for the absence of a writing,
that requirement is met by an electronic communication if the
information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for
subsequent reference."1 52 The CUECIC accessibility test for an
electronic "writing" is also used in the MLEC rule for satisfac-
tion of "information in writing" legal requirements.1
53 In com-
parison, UETA Section 7(c) provides that "[i]f the law requires a
record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law."
1 54
UETA defines an "electronic record" as "a record created, gener-
ated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic
means."' 55 The E-SIGN Act requires that, in order for an elec-
tronic record to satisfy legal record retention requirements, it
must accurately reflect the information set forth in the contract
or other record and remain "accessible to all persons who are
entitled to access by statute, regulation, or rule of law, for the
period required by such statute, regulation, or rule of law, in a
form that is capable of being accurately reproduced for later ref-
149 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 9.
150 Id.
151 Id. 1 (paragraph 1 states that "Nothing in this Convention requires a
communication or a contract to be made or evidenced in any particular form."). Id.
152 Id. 2.
153 MLEC, supra note 137, art. 6(1); "Where the law requires information to be
in writing, that requirement is met by a data message if the information contained
therein is accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference." Id.
154 UETA, supra note 144, § 7(c).
155 Id. § 2(8).
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erence, whether by transmission, printing, or otherwise."156
The CUECIC electronic "writing" rules improve upon the vague
UETA writing rule that defers to its brief definition of electronic
record. 157 It might also be preferable to the E-SIGN electronic
"writing" rule, which depends in part on an individualized
evaluation of the accuracy of the reproduction of record
information.158
4. Electronic "Signature"
CUECIC Article 9, paragraph 3, provides for the satisfac-
tion of the legal requirement of a signature through an elec-
tronic communication, as follows:
Where the law requires that a communication or a contract
should be signed by a party, or provides consequences for the ab-
sence of a signature, that requirement is met in relation to an
electronic communication if:(a) A method is used to identify the party and to indicate that
party's intention in respect of the information contained in the
electronic communication; and
(b) The method used is either:
(i) As reliable as appropriate for the purpose for which the
electronic communication was generated or communi-
cated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any
relevant agreement, or(ii) Proven in fact to have fulfilled the functions described in
subparagraph (a) above, by itself or together with further
evidence.159
156 E-SIGN, supra note 143, § 7001(d)(1).
157 Compare Final UNCITRAL Report, Annex I, supra note 13, art. 9, 2("Where the law requires that a communication or a contract should be in writing,
or provides consequences for the absence of a writing, that requirement is met by
an electronic communication if the information contained therein is accessible so
as to be usable for subsequent reference"), with UETA, supra note 144, § 7 ("(a) A
record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforcement solely because itis in electronic form. (b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability
solely because an electronic record was used in its formation. (c) If a law requires a
record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law. (d) If a law requires a
signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.").
158 E-SIGN, supra note 143, § 7001(d)(1), (3) (E-SIGN grants an electronic
"contract or other record" the status of an original if the record "accurately reflects
the information set forth in the contract or other record" and "remains accessible to
all persons who are entitled to access... in a form that is capable of being accu-
rately reproduced for later reference. . .") Id.
159 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 9.
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The requirement that such electronic communications
must have appropriately reliable methods to identify the par-
ties to the contract is similar to Article 7(1) of MLEC for "data
messages."160 The requirement of an earlier CUECIC draft Ar-
ticle 9 that a valid method must also indicate a party's approval
of the communication was changed in the final CUECIC draft to
require only a party's "intention in respect of' the information
contained in the electronic communication. 161 This change was
made in response to comments by Singapore that electronic sig-
natures are sometimes required only to indicate a party's asso-
ciation with information in a communication, rather than their
approval of that information.162 A notary's signature and a wit-
ness's signature are two examples of this distinction. Article 9,
paragraph 3(b) was changed from an earlier version that had
tracked the language of Article 7(1)(b) of the MLEC, by
designating the earlier MLEC-based language as subparagraph
(b)(i) and adding the new subparagraph (b)(ii). The purpose of
(b)(ii) is to recognize the validity of certain "ex ante" or pre-dis-
pute techniques that are "recognized as particularly reliable, ir-
respective of the circumstances in which they are used."
63 By
borrowing this "particularly reliable" method test from the
Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 64 subparagraph (b)(ii)
seeks to permit determinations of signature reliability prior to a
contract dispute, which cannot be overturned later by a judge or
other trier of fact.165 By modifying the MLEC-based require-
ment of special signature reliability, CUECIC might enhance
certainty, increase cost-effectiveness, and strengthen technolog-
ical neutrality by permitting electronic signatures to be authen-
ticated by the same type of evidence used for handwritten
signatures. 166
160 MLEC, supra note 137, art. 7(1).
161 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 9.
162 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Draft Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts: Compilation of Comments by Govern-
ments and International Organizations (Singapore), 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/578!
Add.10 (May 17, 2005) [hereinafter Country Comments]. See also Final UNCI-
TRAL Report, supra note 13, 61-64.
163 Country Comments, supra note 162, 10.
164 Id.
165 Id. 11-13.
166 Id. IT 17-20.
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The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures(MLES), approved in 2001, creates a presumption of reliability
for certain types of electronic signatures described therein. 167
The CUECIC choice of technological neutrality among signa-
ture methods is more consistent with MLEC than is the MLES
presumption in favor of certain "public key encryption" signa-
ture technologies.168 The MLES model is similar to that of the
European Union Directive on Electronic Signatures, enacted in
1999, which favors certain types of electronic signature technol-
ogies over others on the basis of perceived reliability.169
The MLES model was rejected by the federal E-SIGN Act
and UETA, neither of which establishes any criteria for the va-
lidity of electronic signatures other than being "attached to or
logically associated with" a contract or other record 170 and exe-
cuted or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the re-
cord." 171 CUECIC's rules on electronic "signatures" might be
preferable to the UETA and E-SIGN rules if the latter rules re-
quire proof of subjective intent to sign. The CUECIC test of re-
liable identification of the signer and of their intention in
respect of the electronic communication might permit proof of
intent to sign through the objective record of performance of an
identification method, rather than requiring proof of subjective
intent.
5. Electronic "Original"
CUECIC Article 9, paragraphs 4 and 5, rules on electronic
"originals," were prompted by the applicability of CUECIC, in
article 19, "to the use of electronic communications in connec-
tion with the formation or performance of a contract or agree-
ment" to which the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Conven-
167 Model Law on Electronic Signatures of the United Nations Commission,
art. 6, T 3, 14, G.A. Res. 56/80, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/80 (Jan. 24, 2002) [hereinafter
MLES].
168 Id. 14.
169 European Union Directive on Electronic Signatures, 1999/93, art. 2, 1999
O.J. (L13) 43 (EC).
170 E-SIGN, supra note 143, §7006(5).
171 UETA, supra note 144, § 2(8).
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tion) applies. 172 This applicability created a need to determine
the electronic equivalent of the physical "original" arbitration
agreement, which (or a certified copy of which) must be prof-
fered in order to enforce rights under the New York Conven-
tion.173 The CUECIC rules for electronic originals are not
limited, however, to arbitration agreements.
The first CUECIC requirement for an "original" electronic
communication or contract is "reliable assurance as to the in-
tegrity of the information it contains from the time when it was
first generated in its final form, as an electronic communication
or otherwise.' 74 Reliable assurance is tested by "whether the
information has remained complete and unaltered, apart from
the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises
in the normal course of communication, storage and display,"'
75
and is "assessed in the light of the purpose for which the infor-
mation was generated and in the light of all the relevant cir-
cumstances." 176 The second requirement for an electronic
"original" is that "[w]here it is required that the information it
contains be made available, that information is capable of being
displayed to the person to whom it is to be made available."'
177
CUECIC provisions on the necessary forms of electronic
communications required for legal equivalence with physical
"writings," "signatures," and "originals" cannot be varied by
agreement pursuant to the exercise of party autonomy under
CUECIC Article 3.178 Despite objections that the CUECIC defi-
nition of an original document tested only the integrity of the
document and not its uniqueness (i.e. there might be multiple
"originals"), the definition was retained without a requirement
172 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, arts. 9, 19. See also
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 4.
173 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, $$ 129-135.
174 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 9, 4(a).
175 Id. Annex 1, art. 9, 5(a).
176 Id. Annex 1, art. 9, 5(b).
177 Id. Annex 1, art. 9, 4(b). The final draft of CUECIC article 9 would have
excluded through an additional paragraph 6 the application of paragraph 4 and 5's
rules on originals to original documents presented for the purpose of claiming pay-
ment under a letter of credit, a bank guarantee or a similar instrument. The need
for this paragraph was eliminated by the substitution of the phrase "made availa-
ble" for the word "presented" in paragraphs 4 and 5. See Final Draft CUECIC,
supra note 129, art. 9, 6.
178 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, 33.
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for uniqueness, in view of the exclusion from the scope of
CUECIC of documents required for negotiable instruments or
documents of title.179
Except for the substitution of the phrase "made available"
for the word "presented," and two other terminology changes,
the CUECIC requirements for an electronic "original" are the
same as in MLEC. The MLEC substitutes the term "informa-
tion" for the CUECIC phrase "a communication or a contract,"
and substitutes the term "data message" for the CUECIC term
"electronic communication. ' 18 0 E-SIGN section 7001(d)(1) and
(3) grants an electronic "contract or other record" the status of
an original if the record "(A) accurately reflects the information
set forth in the contract or other record; and (B) remains acces-
sible to all persons who are entitled to access.. .in a form that is
capable of being accurately reproduced for later reference..."' 8 1
Section 12(a) and (d) of UETA defines an "original" to mean an
electronic record that "(1) accurately reflects the information set
forth in the record after it was first generated in its final form
as an electronic record or otherwise; and (2) remains accessible
for later reference." 182
The CUECIC test for an electronic "original" might be pref-
erable to the E-SIGN and UETA tests if, as is also possible for
the E-SIGN electronic "writing" rules, the E-SIGN and UETA
tests require a difficult determination of the accuracy of repro-
duction of electronic record information. The CUECIC test of
"originality" 8 3 might permit proof of reliability of assurance of
record integrity through an objective record of performance of
the method of assurance, rather than through an individualized
179 Id. I 70.
180 MLEC, supra note 137, art. 8(l)-(3).
181 E-SIGN, supra note 143, (d)(1)(A), (B)(d)(3).
182 UETA, supra note 144, § 12(a), (d).
183 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, art. 9, 4 (the paragraph states
"[w]here the law requires that a communication or contract should be made availa-
ble or retained in its original form, or provides consequences for the absence of an
original, that requirement is met in relation to an electronic communication if: (a)
There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the information it contains
from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as an electronic commu-
nication or otherwise; and (b) Where it is required that the information it contains
be made available, that information is capable of being displayed to the person to
whom it is to be made available.").
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evaluation of the accuracy of the reproduction of record
information.184
C. Time and Place of Dispatch and Receipt (or the
"Electronic Mailbox Rule")
CUECIC Article 10, paragraph 1, states the rule for the
time of dispatch of an electronic communication as
the time when it leaves an information system under the control
of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the origi-
nator or, if the electronic communication has not left an informa-
tion system under the control of the originator or of the party who
sent it on behalf of the originator, the time when the electronic
communication is received.
18 5
The stated alternative rule for communications that have
not left the originator's information system is intended to apply
to situations such as the posting of information on a website.
1 8 6
CUECIC Article 10, paragraph 2, sets forth the rule for the
time of receipt of an electronic communication as
the time when it becomes capable of being retrieved by the ad-
dressee at an electronic address designated by the addressee. The
time of receipt of an electronic communication at another elec-
tronic address of the addressee is the time when it becomes capa-
ble of being retrieved by the addressee at that address and the
addressee becomes aware that the electronic communication has
been sent to that address. An electronic communication is pre-
sumed to be capable of being retrieved by the addressee when it
reaches the addressee's electronic address.
1 8 7
The CUECIC time of receipt rules are based on addressee
ability to retrieve a communication, rather than entry into an
addressee "information system," defined by CUECIC Article 4(f)
184 Compare E-SIGN, supra note 143, (d)(1)(A), (B)(d)(3) (requiring that an
original "accurately reflects the information set forth in the contract or other re-
cord."), with UETA, supra note 144, § 12(a) (requiring an electronic record that
"accurately reflects the information set forth in the record after it was first gener-
ated in its final form as an electronic record or otherwise; and remains accessible
for later reference") (Both E-SIGN and UETA require the accuracy of the electronic
record to determine an original's validity. The tests for E-SIGN and UETA are
more subjective than the CUECIC test).
185 Final UNCITRAL Report Annex I, supra note 13, art. 10, 1 1.
186 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 143.
187 Final UNCITRAL Report Annex I, supra note 13, art. 10, 2.
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as "a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing or other-
wise processing data messages."' 88 Rules based on information
system entry rules were rejected by the Working Group for both
the time of dispatch and the time of receipt rules.18 9 Arguments
prevailing against information system entry-based rules in-
cluded the uncertainty of the legal relationship required be-
tween an addressee and the information system,190 and the
uncertain effect on data retrieval of "measures implemented by
companies and individuals to preserve the integrity, security or
usability of their information systems (for instance to block
"spam" mail or prevent the spread of viruses) [that] had led in
practice to repeated loss of communications.' 9 1
Designated information system entry is the primary crite-
rion for time of dispatch and receipt of electronic messages in
Article 15 of the MLEC, 192 and Section 15 of UETA, with the
latter also requiring proper direction to the designated system
and a form of electronic record capable of being processed by the
designated system. 193 The information system entry test found
support in the Working Group as a more objective test than ca-
pability to retrieve a message, 194 but it was ultimately rejected
for determinations of either time of dispatch or time of re-
ceipt.195 The UNCITRAL Secretariat noted, however, that
"[tihe differences in wording between Article 10 of the draft con-
vention and Article 15 of the Model Law are not intended to
produce a different practical result. ."196 Further, the Secreta-
riat characterizes CUECIC Article 10 "as a set of presumptions,
rather than a firm rule on receipt of electronic communica-
tions."' 97 Therefore, "[diespite the different wording used... as
is the case under article 15 of the Model Law, the draft conven-
188 Id. art. 4(f).
189 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 9 142, 146.
190 Id. 146.
191 Id. 148 (brackets in original). A specific exemption to the time of receipt
rule to account for the effects of technological filters was proposed, but ultimately
rejected by the Working Group. See Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 91
153.
192 MLEC, supra note 137, art. 15(1), (2).
193 UETA, supra note 144, § 15(a)-(b).
194 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 1$ 151-61.
195 See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, IT 50-52.
196 Id. 91 49.
197 Id. 1 51.
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tion retains the objective test of entry of a communication in an
information system to determine when an electronic communi-
cation is presumed to be 'capable of being retrieved' and there-
fore 'received."' 198
Unlike CUECIC, MLEC provides that data messages sent
to an address other than the one designated by the addressee
may be considered received only when they are actually re-
trieved by the intended addressee. 199 Under the MLEC, how-
ever, data messages sent to an addressee who has not
designated an address are considered received when they enter
any information system of the addressee. 200
UETA Section 15 provides that an electronic record is sent
when it "enters an information processing system outside the
control of the sender," or enters "an information processing sys-
tem that the recipient has designated or uses," if it is properly
addressed and "is in a form capable of being processed by that
system."20 ' UETA provides that an electronic record is received
when "(1) it enters an information processing system that the
recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving
electronic records or information of the type sent and from
which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record; and
(2) it is in a form capable of being processed by that system,"
regardless of the addressee's awareness of receipt of the elec-
tronic record.20 2
CUECIC Article 10, paragraph 2, requires for receipt of any
message sent to any non-designated address that the message
must be "capable of being retrieved" and the addressee must be
"aware that the electronic communication has been sent to that
address."203 The reason for the stricter treatment of receipt of
messages sent to a non-designated address (and not simply an
incorrect address) under CUECIC compared with the MLEC is
that, since the adoption of the MLEC the growth in security fil-
ters and firewalls has reduced the likelihood that electronic
messages will reach their addressee. 20 4 Therefore, rules on re-
198 Id. 52.
199 MLEC, supra note 137, art. 15(2)(a)(ii).
200 Id. art. 15(2)(b).
201 UETA, supra note 144, § 15(a).
202 Id. § 15(b), (e).
203 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, art. 10, 2.
204 Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, 56.
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ceipt should "be linked to consent to use a particular electronic
address, and should not compel persons who had not agreed to
bear the risk of loss of communications that were sent to an-
other address."205
The CUECIC rule for time of receipt is clearly preferable to
its predecessors. For designated electronic addresses, the capa-
bility of retrieval test and presumption eliminate the ambigu-
ous system entry test of the MLEC and UETA. For non-
designated addresses of the addressee, the CUECIC capability
of retrieval and awareness of the communication tests are
clearer than the MLEC system entry test for receipt. The
CUECIC tests are more equitable to the sender when the com-
munication is sent to the wrong electronic address of the ad-
dressee, but the addressee is aware of the communication and
capable of retrieving it. UETA does not discuss the issue of re-
ceipt of communications sent to non-designated electronic ad-
dresses of the addressee.
CUECIC Article 10, paragraph 3, establishes the rule for
place of dispatch and receipt of electronic communications that
"[a]n electronic communication is deemed to be dispatched at
the place where the originator has its place of business and is
deemed to be received at the place where the addressee has its
place of business, as determined in accordance with article
6."206 Paragraph 4 provides that paragraph 2's time of receipt
rule applies, "notwithstanding that the place where the infor-
mation system. . . is located may be different from the place
where the electronic communication is deemed to be received
under paragraph 3 of this article. '20 7 These are the same rules
set forth in Article 15 of the MLEC 2o8 and in Section 15 of
UETA.20 9
205 Id.
206 Final UNCITRAL Report Annex I, supra note 13, art. 10, % 3.
207 Id. 4.
208 MLEC, supra note 137, art. 15. See also Note by the Secretariat, supra note
14, 49 (stating that: "The differences in wording between article 10 of the draft
convention and article 15 of the Model Law are not intended to produce a different
practical result.").
209 UETA, supra note 144, § 15; provides "[T]he federal Electronic Signatures
Act ignores contract formation issues entirely, which is the strongest argument for
state legislatures to enact UETA and supersede the ESA, which provides little gui-
dance or certainty to commercial parties engaged in electronic commerce." Chris-
[Vol. 17:261
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/6
2005] UNCITRAL ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS CONVENTION 295
D. Other Electronic Communication Rules
1. Invitations for Offers; Electronic Agents
CUECIC Article 11, "Invitations to make offers" establishes
the rule that a proposal to contract that is not directed at a par-
ticular party, but that is generally accessible, is only an invita-
tion to make an offer "unless it clearly indicates the intention of
the party making the proposal to be bound in case of accept-
ance."210 The exception is meant to apply to cases of "offers of
goods through Internet auctions and similar transactions...
There are no provisions dealing with invitations to make
offers in MLEC, E-SIGN or UETA. Article 14(2) of the CISG, on
the other hand, provides that "[a] proposal other than one ad-
dressed to one or more specific persons is to be considered
merely as an invitation to make offers, unless the contrary is
clearly indicated by the person making the proposal."21 2 This
provision was relied upon in Working Group discussions to
counter the argument that CUECIC Article 11 would introduce
a concept that was unrecognizable within certain legal
systems. 2
1 3
CUECIC Article 12, "Use of automated message systems
for contract formation" authorizes contract formation through
"the interaction of an automated message system and a natural
person, or by the interaction of automated message sys-
tems. .. "214 CUECIC Article 11 is intended, however, to pre-
vent the mere offer of interactive applications for the placement
of orders from creating a presumption of intent to be bound by
all orders placed through the system.215 E-SIGN Section
7001(h) approves contract formation through "electronic
agents" whose actions are "legally attributable to the person to
be bound."216 UETA Section 14 approves contracts formed by
topher T. Poggi, Note: Electronic Commerce Legislation: An Analysis of European
and American Approaches to Contract Formation, 41 VA. J. INT'L. 224, 260 (2000).
210 Final UNCITRAL Report Annex I, supra note 13, art. 11.
211 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 171.
212 CISG, supra note 16, art. 14(2).
213 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 1 169.
214 Final UNCITRAL Report Annex I, supra note 13, art. 12.
215 Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, 91 43.
216 E-SIGN, supra note 143 § 7001(h).
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interaction of electronic agents or of an electronic agent and an
individual. 217
2. Availability of Contract Terms; Errors and Corrections
CUECIC Article 13, "Availability of contract terms" defers
to domestic law on requirements to make contract terms availa-
ble in a particular manner.218 CUECIC Article 14, "Error in
electronic communications," applies "[w]here a natural person
makes an input error in an electronic communication ex-
changed with the automated message system of another party
and the.. .system does not provide the person with an opportu-
nity to correct the error. .. "219 In that case, the person has the
right to withdraw the erroneous portion of the communication
under certain circumstances. 220 Paragraph 2 of Article 14 de-
fers to domestic law regarding the effect of non-input errors in
contract formation and performance. 221
UETA Section 10 establishes a separate rule for parties
that "have agreed to use a security procedure to detect changes
or errors."222 In such a case, the party conforming to the proce-
dure has the option to avoid the effect of the error.223 In an
automated transaction involving an individual, however, the in-
dividual may avoid the effect of the error if the electronic agent
did not provide the opportunity for the prevention or correction
of the error, and if the two conditions are met of prompt notice
by the person(s) who committed the error and of their intent to
not be bound by it, and the absence of use or receipt of material
benefit or value by the party in error from the goods or services
received from the other party. These two conditions are also
217 UETA, supra note 144, § 14.
218 Final UNCITRAL Report Annex I, supra note 13, art. 13.
219 Id. art. 14.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 UETA, supra note 144, § 10.
223 Section 10, paragraph 1 of the UETA provides "(1) If the parties have
agreed to use a security procedure to detect changes or errors and one party has
conformed to the procedure, but the other party has not, and the nonconforming
party would have detected the change or error had that party also conformed, the
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required by CUECIC Article 14.224 The third UETA require-
ment that the party in error must take reasonable steps to re-
turn or dispose of the goods or services received from the other
party was eliminated from CUECIC Article 14 as a matter that
national law should govern.
225
Article 14 was criticized in the Working Group as a con-
sumer policy-oriented rule that was inappropriate for commer-
cial transactions and that presented difficult questions of proof
of error.226 The article was retained, however, on the grounds of
the need for an error rule "in view of the relatively higher risk of
human errors being made in communications exchanged with
automated message systems," the need for a uniform rule "in
view of the differing and possibly conflicting solutions that
might be provided for under domestic laws," and the previous
existence of evidentiary problems in resolving allegations of er-
ror in "paper-based" communications.
227
E. Regional Economic Integration Organizations
A new Article 17 was added to the final version of CUECIC
that permits regional economic integration organizations to rat-
ify CUECIC and thereby have the rights and obligations of a
Contracting State to the extent of the organizations' compe-
tence over matters governed by CUECIC. 228 The proper inter-
action of Contracting State CUECIC rules and the CUECIC
224 Id. UETA, section 10, paragraph 2 provides that "In an automated transac-
tion involving an individual, the individual may avoid the effect of an electronic
record that resulted from an error made by the individual in dealing with the elec-
tronic agent of another person if the electronic agent did not provide an opportu-
nity for the prevention or correction of the error and, at the time the individual
learns of the error, the individual: (A) promptly notifies the other person of the
error and that the individual did not intend to be bound by the electronic record
received by the other person; (B) takes reasonable steps, including steps that con-
form to the other person's reasonable instructions, to return to the other person or,
if instructed by the other person, to destroy the consideration received, if any, as a
result of the erroneous electronic record; and (C) has not used or received any ben-
efit or value from the consideration, if any, received from the other person.) Id.
225 Compare UETA, supra note 144, § 10(2), with Final UNCITRAL Report,
supra note 13, 101.
226 Final Working Group Report, supra note 1, 185.
227 Id. 186.
228 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 17.
37
PACE INT'L L. REV.
rules of a regional economic integration organization of which
the State is a member is left to those entities to determine.229
IV. CONCLUSION
In the course of its future use by United States' courts and
practitioners, CUECIC will have an advantage over the CISG in
substantive familiarity, because it shares a common source of
its legal rules with the U.N. Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce, as does the federal E-SIGN Act and UETA. It will there-
fore avoid the instinctive rejection in common law states of civil
law-derived rules on long-established matters such as consider-
ation, oral contracts and parol evidence, which has limited the
use of CISG by parties in those States.230
From the practical viewpoint of improvement of the func-
tioning of electronic commerce, CUECIC rules are clearly an
improvement upon the MLEC and UETA rules concerning time
of receipt of electronic communications, and the UETA elec-
tronic writing rule. CUECIC rules might also be preferable to
the E-SIGN electronic writing rule and to the UETA and E-
SIGN rules on electronic signatures and originals. CUECIC es-
tablishes an invitation for offers rule in electronic commerce
that does not exist in UETA or E-SIGN, and CUECIC estab-
lishes an errors and corrections rule that does not exist in E-
SIGN.
CUECIC will probably apply to future contract disputes in
which the following jurisdictional facts exist: 1) the "places of
business in different States" requirement of Article 1(1) is satis-
fied; 2) no subject matter exclusions from Article 2 apply to the
contract; and 3) no exercise of party autonomy pursuant to Arti-
cle 3 is used to "opt out" of CUECIC; and either (a) the parties
have opted out of the CISG Article 11 "no writing or form re-
quired" rule and have chosen writing and signature require-
ments for enforcement of their contract, or (b) the parties have
opted out of the CISG Article 11 and the applicable law chosen
by them has writing and signature requirements, such as a
state "Statute of Frauds" or state version of U.C.C. §2-201(1), or(c) the parties have opted out of the CISG Article 11 and the
229 Id. 186.
230 Kilian, supra note 103, at 230.
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applicable law chosen through conflict-of-laws rules has writing
and signature requirements, or (d) the CISG version that gov-
erns the contract is subject to an Article 96 national declaration
that maintains writing and signature requirements for contract
enforcement, or (e) the transaction is subject to other treaty re-
quirements for a writing and signature.
The history of the CISG's adoption by U.S. lawyers and of
its interpretation by U.S. judges provides a cautionary example,
however, regarding the procedural pitfalls to the successful in-
corporation of commercial conventions into domestic U.S. law.
Since CUECIC uses the CISG as a procedural model, it might
suffer from these same pitfalls, including the unfamiliarity of
domestic judges with the principles and techniques of jurispru-
dence under international commercial conventions, leading to
domestically-oriented interpretations of transnational codes.
Other pitfalls include the difficulty for judges and lawyers in
finding international conventions within federal statutory
codes, or in finding annotated domestic case law, if a "self-exe-
cuting treaty" is not accompanied by implementing legislation,
which makes the treaty easier to locate among federal laws.
The lack of familiarity with the collections and analyses of for-
eign court decisions and commentaries on CISG provisions on
the part of U.S. judges and lawyers has also been a problem.
Finally, the absence of an official commentary on international
commercial conventions, such as the Uniform Commercial Code
commentary on domestic commercial statutes, limits the devel-
opment of authoritative interpretations of new convention
terms and concepts.
The Working Group proposed CUECIC amendment rules
that included a procedure for the development of official reports
at the request of the Contracting States, "as to the manner in
which the international regimen established in this Convention
has operated in practice."231 The Working Group also proposed
"review conferences" of the Contracting States that would
"from time to time" review CUECIC "effectiveness in facilitat-
ing electronic commerce," "judicial interpretation given to, and
the application made of, the terms of this Convention", and
"[w]hether any modifications to this Convention [CUECIC] are
231 Final UNCITRAL Report, supra note 13, Annex 1, art. 22, Variant B, 1.
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desirable."232 Adoption of these proposals by UNCITRAL might
have provided a mechanism for harmonization of international
electronic commerce law. Similar informal procedures might
promote CUECIC ratification by a large number of states, while
also promoting fulfillment of CUECIC rules of interpretation in
a manner that incorporates practical experience with the imple-
mentation of previous international commercial conventions,
like the CISG. Although these amendment rules were elimi-
nated from the final CUECIC draft, their objective to promote
the use and understanding of CUECIC in the United States and
elsewhere might be fulfilled through other informal procedures.
If such procedures develop, they might reduce CUECIC avoid-
ance as optional law by transaction parties because of their lack
of understanding of CUECIC provisions and their lack of famili-
arity with the record of CUECIC interpretation in practice.
232 Id. 2.
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